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notice to the public that they may successfully sue a state official for the
deprivation of their federal rights,
whether the official was acting in accordance with the state's laws or in
abuse ofthem. Hafer sends a message
to public officials who do not enjoy
absolute immunity that they will be
held personally accountable for depriving citizens oftheir federal rights,
regardless of the nature of officials'
actions. With the cautionary signal
that the Supreme Court is sending
through Hafer, state officials must
make less arbitrary, and more thoughtful decisions or else be held accountable to the public they serve.
- Kenneth J. Goldsmith
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't ofNatural Resources:
WASTE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS VIOLATE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE CLAUSE.
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Dep't ofNatural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), the

United States Supreme Court held that
because solid waste is constitutionally
protected as an article of commerce,
any regulation imposed upon the movement of solid waste must withstand
strict scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause ofthe United States Constitution. The Court found that the waste
import restrictions ofMichigan's Solid
Waste Management Act ("SWMA")
were economically protectionist and,
thus, in violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Two provisions implementing
waste import restrictions were adopted
in 1988 when Michigan's SWMA was
amended. Section 299.413a prohibited the disposal of solid waste from
other counties and states in any county
in Michigan. However, waste could be
imported into a county ifthat county's
solid waste management plan explicitly authorized the importation of outof-county waste. Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill (''Fort Gratiof') applied to the
St. Clair County Solid Waste Planning
24

Committee ("Committee") in 1989 for
approval to accept out-of-state waste.
Even though Fort Gratiot promised to
reserve space for waste generated within
the county, the Committee denied the
application because the county's solid
waste management plan did not authorize the acceptance of waste originating outside the county.
Fort Gratiot contested the decision,
charging that Michigan's 1988 SWMA
waste import restrictions were unconstitutional because they authorized the
counties to prevent privately owned
operations from participating in interstate commerce. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan held that there was no
fucial discrimination because the county
plan did not treat states any worse than
other counties in Michigan. The district court noted that each county had
the option of disallowing waste generated from outside the county to enter
county landfills and, therefore, the statute did not place an outright ban on
out-of-state waste. Based upon their
analysis of Michigan's SWMA, the
district court dismissed Fort Gratiot's
complaint. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the districtcourt'sreasoningandaifmnedthe
decision. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine
the SWMA's constitutionality. The
Supreme Court rejected the state court's
analysis that solid waste had no constitutional protection because it was valueless. Id. at 2022. The Court reasoned that ''whether the business arrangements between out-of-state generators of waste and the Michigan operatorofa waste disposal site are viewed
as "sales" ofgarbage or ''purchases'' of
transportation and disposal services,
the commercial transactions unquestionably have an interstate character."
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. Relying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
in which a New Jersey law prohibiting
the importation of out of state waste
was struck down as violative of the
Commerce Clause, the Court stated
that although solid waste has no value,

it is an article ofcommerce and, therefore, the interstate movement of solid
waste is regulated by the Commerce
Clause. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at
2023 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978».
Michigan and St. Clair County attempted to circumvent the application
of the Commerce Clause by distinguishing Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
because there, the prohibition was
placed only upon out-of-state waste.
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. They
argued that Michigan's SWMA did
not place an unreasonable burden upon
interstate commerce because the restrictions treated states and other Michigan counties in a similar manner. Id.
The Court, however, disagreed with
this argument and declared that "a burden imposed by a State upon interstate
commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it
applies alike to the people of all the
States, including the people ofthe State
enacting such statute." Fort Gratiot,
112 S. Ct. at 2025 (quoting Brimmerv.
Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891».
The Court declared that it was immaterial that other counties in Michigan had adopted separate plans which
allowed the importation of out-ofcounty waste. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct.
at 2025. The discretion given to the
counties by the SWMA amendments
was deemed not to exempt the statute
from scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 2025-26. As in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where a
New Jersey statute gave a state agency
the permission to import certain categories of waste, the Court in Fort
Gratiot held that Michigan's authorization for counties to accept out-ofcounty waste ''merely reduced the scope
of the discrimination," but it did not
cure the discriminatory effect upon
interstate commerce. Fort Gratiot,
112 S. Ct. at 2025.
The Court noted that under the
Commerce Clause, a state statute that
discriminates against interstate commerce is unconstitutional "unless the
discrimination is demonstrably justi-
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fied by a valid factor unrelated to ec0nomic protectionism." Id. at 2024
(quoting New Energy Co. ofIndiana v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988».
Michigan and St. Clair County claimed
that the amendments were not economically motivated~ rather, they were
intended to protect the health and safety
ofthe citizens. ForlGratiol, 112 S. Ct.
at 2026. The Court explained that
"because [the] provisions unambiguously discriminate against interstate
commerce, the State bears the burden
of proving that they further health and
safety concerns that cannot be adequately served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives." Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct.
at 2027. In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986), the Court upheld Maine's
ban on the importation of live baitfish
because of parasites and other problems the nonnative baitfish posed. The
Court concluded that Michigan's Waste
Import Restrictions violated the Commerce Clause because the amendments
failed to present a reason, apart from
origin, why solid waste from outside
the county should be treated differently from solid waste from inside the
county. Fori Gratiol, 112 S. Ct. at
2027-28.
The Court stressed that even if a
legitimate goal were sought, illegitimate means to achieve that goal may
not be used. Id at 2027. Michiganand
St. Clair County asserted that the restrictions were needed to allow counties to adequately plan for the safe
disposal offuture waste. Fort Gratiot,
112 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court acknowledged that "although accurate
forecasts may be an indispensable part
ofa comprehensive waste disposal plan,
Michigan could attain that objective
without discriminating between in- and
out-of-state waste." Id at 2027.
In his dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the case should
be remanded for consideration of
whether the SWMA amendments were
based upon legitimate local health and
safetyconcerns.Id. at2028. TheChief
Justice asserted that in light of the
problems associated with the disposal

of waste, Michigan was taking reasonable measures to protect its citizens and
was not constructing a form of ec0nomic protectionism. Id at 2028-29.
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared, "the
Cou rt today penalizes the State ofMichigan for what to all appearances are its
good-faith efforts, in tum encouraging
each State to ignore the waste problem
in the hope that another will pick up the
slack." Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at
2031.
In Fori Gratiol, the Court imposed
a strict standard against the implementation of discriminatory waste import
laws. The Court will strike down any
statute that interferes with interstate
commerce, unless a state can show that
the restrictions were nece~sary to protect its citizens and that there were no
less discriminatory options. In order
for states or counties to enforce a waste
management plan, the area that is to be
protected must be held to the same
standards that are imposed upon other
counties and states.
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen
In re Criminal Investigation No. Jf
242Q: ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE

RECORDS NOT PRIVILEGED
FROM SUBPOENA.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
recently held that requiring an attorney
to disclose jury records ofthe fees paid
by two former clients to a grand jury did
not violate the attorney-client privilege. In re Criminal Investigation No.
Jl242Q, 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220
(1992). The court emphasized that
although Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility, governing confidentiality, is broader than the
attorney-client privilege rule in Maryland, it does not provide an absolute
shield to prevent this information from
being subpoenaed.
As part of an investigation of known
or suspected narcotics traffickers, the
state routinely sought evidence of violations of the state income tax laws.
The growing trend in narcotics investigation was to seek evidence of expenditures of large sums of money, includ-

ing attorney's fees, as a means of
interpolating the net worth of a suspect. For this reason, the Grand Jury
for Anne Arundel County issued a
subpoena duces tecum to attorney William H. Murphy, Jr. for the fee records
of two of his former clients.
In a motion to quash the subpoena,
Mr. Murphy pleaded that he had expressly promised his clients that all
information about fees "would be personal, privileged, and confidential
because of, among other things, the
growing practice of prosecutors nationwide to use such information to
establish violations of the narcotics
laws .... " Id. at 6,602 A.2dat 1222.
He argued that to reveal the information in light of his client's express
request that he not, was a breach of
confidentiality .
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County granted the motion to quash
the subpoena on the grounds that ''the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct have 'enlarged the general principle of confidentiality. '" Id. at 3,602
A.2d at 1221. On behalf of the grand
jury, the State filed an appeal to the
court of special appeals. Before the
intermediate court heard the case, however, the Court of Appeals of Mary. land granted certiorari and reversed
the circuit court's decision, holding
that Rule 1.6 and the judicial application of the attorney-client privilege
rule are distinct concepts. The court
found that Rule 1.6 does not enlarge
the attorney-client privilege rule in
Maryland.
The court of appeals began by analyzing Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Citing the
prefatory material to the Rules, which
stated: "Moreover, these Rules are not
intended to govern or affect judicial
application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege, the court
rejected the lower court's contention
that the adoption of this rule by the
Maryland legislature affectively expanded the attorney-client privilege."
Id at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221 (quoting
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
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